There is a great deal about the underlying implications of Agemben's argument that resonated as a slightly different take on Butler's same dilemma. Where Agemben argues for the collapse of zoe and bios such that our once natural and pure 'bare life' is politicized in a way that the two experiences may no longer be had without the other, Butler seems to be implicitly positing a similar case for pre-subjectivity.

A quick clarification/pondering: If we accept Butler's definition of 'the subject' as NOT interchangeable with 'the individual' or 'the person,' but instead as "the linguistic occasion for the individual to achieve and reproduce intelligibility" (p12), at what point or in what instance, might one not be considered a 'subject'?

I'm surprised that no one has posted yet about D+G's segments on rhizomic consciousness. The key slogan ('Write with slogans!') is at 15 in TP: 'Many people have a tree growing in their heads, but the brain itself is much more a grass than a tree.'