Beginning on p.39, Baud delves into his analysis of the psychology of nuclear might, arguing that acquiring the tangible means for nuclear warfare will never result in the 'real' deployment of these weapons. Acquiring nuclear weapons is to acquire the deterrent. Because they can, they will not. Hence, deterrence, in Baudrillard's account. Global acquisition (and consumption) of this deterrent is "an accelerated process of implosion."

I, wonder though, how much we remain debilitated by fear of a threat that will never come. Recalling conversations about Iraq and North Korea - and more recently Iran - it seems that the average media consumer/'citizen' has become less entangled in the actuality of threat. We seem to be acknowledging, in more informal discourses, the very observation that Baudrillard, with all of his theoretical might, claims is part of the simulation that we do not inherently see: that this is just a struggle for power and legitimation.

Perhaps I am oversimplifying this claim, but I wonder, what does it mean then, for his argument, if we - the common folk - are no longer fooled by the scene of deterrence? Is this strategy of the real failing itself?